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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
MSLF is a nonprofit, public-interest legal foundation organized under the laws of the
State of Colorado. MSLF’s members include individuals who live and work in every State of the
Nation. MSLF is dedicated to bringing before the courts those issues vital to the defense and
preservation of individual liberty, the right to own and use property, limited and ethical
government, and the free enterprise system. MSLF believes that the federal government is one
of limited, enumerated powers to be exercised consistently with the U.S. Constitution. These
limited powers include Congress’s commerce power, as conferred by the Commerce Clause.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. MSLF believes that Congress commonly exceeds its commerce
power to justify vastly increasing the scope of congressional legislation beyond what is
constitutionally permissible. The result of such overreaching is a federal government that is no
longer limited and ethical, and further erosion of individual liberty, the right to own and use
property, and the free enterprise system. MSLF has often been involved in litigation concerning
Commerce Clause issues, including, most recently, filing amicus curiae briefs in San Luis &
Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar, No. 10-15192 (9th Cir.), Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), GDF Realty Investments, LTD v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (D.C. Cir.
2004), and Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003). MSLF submits that,
in passing the Health Care Act, Congress has, once again, but this time in an extraordinarily bold
and unprecedented manner, exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause.
ARGUMENT
On March 23, 2010, a new health care regime entitled “Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act,” Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“Health Care Act”), was signed into law.
Sections 1501 and 1502 of the Health Care Act include an “Individual Mandate” that requires all

1
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non-exempt Americans to maintain what Congress deems to be an acceptable level of health
insurance coverage.
The Individual Mandate was passed purportedly pursuant to Congress’s enumerated
power under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, which
provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes[.]” Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“The congressional enactment under review .
. . literally forges new ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high
watermark.”) Therefore, Congress tried to demonstrate its belief that the Individual Mandate
affects interstate commerce:
(a)

FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1)
IN GENERAL.—The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects described in
paragraph (2).
(2)
EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:
(A)
The requirement regulates activity that is
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when
health insurance is purchased. In the absence of the requirement,
some individuals would make an economic and financial decision
to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure,
which increases financial risks to households and medical
providers. . . .
See Health Care Act, § 1501. By purporting to derive its power to enact the Individual Mandate
from the Commerce Clause, Congress engaged in an unprecedented power grab, wholly at odds
with the constitutional principle of a limited federal government of enumerated powers.

2
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THE PRINCIPLE OF A LIMITED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
ENUMERATED POWERS IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES.
A.

The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers
Can Be Traced Back To The Pre-Revolutionary Period.

In the 18th century, British power was concentrated entirely in the “King-in-Parliament”
(i.e., the King, Lords, and Commons). Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 Yale L.R. 1425, 1431 (1987). Britons understood this power as being absolute. Id.; see also
William Blackstone, Of the Nature of Laws in General, in Commentaries on the Laws of
England § 2 (1765-69) (In all governments, there is “a supreme, irresistible, absolute,
uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii or the rights of sovereignty, reside.”)
available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-002.htm. Many American colonists,
however, due in part to their struggles with the British Parliament, had developed a profoundly
different view of government—one in which all power was derived from the people themselves.
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background
Principle of Strict Construction, 50 Wm. & Mary L.R. 1577, 1593 (2009).
Moreover, the colonial governments themselves reinforced the colonists’ understanding
that a government derives its power from the people. Typically, each colony was governed by a
corporate charter. Amar, supra, at 1432–33. These charters, such as the Massachusetts Bay
Company Charter, established a governor and other governmental agents, much like corporate
agents. Id. at 1433. It was, therefore, understood that, like corporate agents, the colonial
governmental officials possessed only specific, enumerated powers; purported government
actions beyond the scope of the charter had no legal authority. Id. at 1433-35 (citing
A. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism 38-65, 104-28 (1961)). Thus,

3
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many colonists believed that, unlike in Britain, parliamentary acts that conflicted with principles
in the Magna Carta (“Great Charter”) were null and void. Amar, supra, at 1432-34.
As a result, many colonists objected not only to Parliament’s actual policies, but also to
the principle that the power of Parliament was unlimited. Amar, supra, at 1430. The Boston Tea
Party, for example, was a protest against both a tax on tea and the notion that Parliament had the
power to tax tea. Amar, supra, at 1430 n.21 (citing J. Blum, E. Morgan, W. Rose,
A. Schlesinger, K. Stampp, and C. Woodward, The National Experience 94 (1973)). Indeed, the
Tea Party took place after Parliament had reduced a tax on tea in an attempt to acclimate
colonists to the principle of plenary parliamentary taxation powers. Id. Thus, the predominant
colonial view was that Parliament’s power was not absolute but, instead, was limited. Id.
B.

The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers
Is Evident In The Declaration of Independence.

In 1776, the Founders used the principle of a limited government of enumerated powers
as their primary justification for independence from England. The Declaration of Independence
famously provides that individuals are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights.” Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). In other words, rights are not derived
from Parliament or any other governmental body, but, instead, exist by virtue of an individual’s
existence. The Declaration, therefore:
[S]peaks simply to the question of whether rights come from government by
posing, in effect, the question of where government would get its rights if not
from the people—it being clear that people create and hence come before
government. In both logic and time, then, people come first, government second.
That was the central point the Founders sought to pin down.
Roger Pilon, The Purpose and Limits of Government, Cato’s Letter #13 6 (1999). The
unalienable rights possessed by the people—generally, the right to be free and independent—
were far too numerous to be listed specifically, though the Founders sought generally to capture

4
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the essence of these rights by providing that “among these [rights] are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.” Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
In addition to the unalienable rights, John Locke1 explained that each individual
possesses an “Executive Power,” i.e., the right to secure an individual’s unalienable rights.
Pilon, supra, at 15 (citing John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 13 (1690)).
Accordingly, the Declaration of Independence provides a mechanism for securing the
unalienable rights of the people. The Declaration explains that governments are “instituted”
for the limited purpose of “secur[ing] these rights” of the people, and the authority of the
government to secure these rights is “derive[ed] . . . from the consent of the governed.”
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Consequently, the government’s power exists solely because the people have conferred
upon the government their right to secure their inalienable rights. Naturally, then, for the
government to have the power to secure a purported right, individuals must first have possessed
that power, and then, through the consent of the governed, must have delegated that power to the
government. This provides the foundational premise behind the principle of enumerated
powers.2

1

As has been documented frequently, John Locke was the primary philosophical influence for
Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. See, e.g., American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County, Kentucky, 354 F.3d 438, 453 n.7
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of
Ideas 79 (1922) (noting that with respect to “the political philosophy of Nature and natural
rights” referenced in the Declaration that the “lineage is direct: Jefferson copied Locke”)),
aff’d, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
2

In the specific context of this case, for the government to secure a purported “right” to
affordable health care, individuals must first have possessed the right to force other individuals
to acquire health insurance or pay a penalty. Because individuals have never possessed such a
right, they could not possibly have delegated that right to the government.

5
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The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers
Is Explicitly Included In The Articles Of Confederation.

In the years following the Declaration of Independence, the principle of a limited
government of enumerated powers was not abandoned. On the contrary, the Articles of
Confederation, the first constitutional document in the United States, begins by providing,
“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled.”3 Articles of Confederation, art. II. Only after so providing does the
document proceed to discuss which enumerated powers were delegated to the United States
government. See Articles of Confederation, art. IX. Thus, the Founders, keenly aware of the
dangers that resulted from a tyrannical English government, were careful to create a limited
government possessing only a few enumerated powers.4

3

James Madison clarified that, in this context, “states” “means the people composing those
political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity.” James Madison, Report on the Virginia
Resolutions (Jan. 1800), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
v1ch8s42.html.
4

The Articles of Confederation, however, were inadequate because, inter alia, they did not
sufficiently limit the power of state governments. States had become engaged in the practice of
enacting protectionist legislation to protect local industries and businesses. See, e.g., Dept. of
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 363 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
Founders ultimately rectified this deficiency with the insertion of the Commerce Clause in the
Constitution. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (citing The Federalist No. 22, at 143-145 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961);
James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 Writings of James
Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). The Commerce Clause, therefore, fulfilled the Founders’
desire to ensure free trade amongst the States, unrestrained by governmental biases, prejudices,
or regulations.

6
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The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers Is
Enshrined In The Constitution.
1.

The Constitutional Convention proposed a federal government
of enumerated powers.

“The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national
government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and unlimited powers. This is
apparent . . . from the history of the proceedings of the convention, which framed it. . . .” Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 2 § 906 (1833) available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_1s28.html. At the very beginning of
the Constitutional Convention, James Madison expressed his desire for a national government of
explicitly enumerated powers, though he was uncertain whether such an enumeration could be
accomplished. William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 901, 945 (2008). Other delegates of the Convention, though not all, similarly
expressed support for an enumeration of powers. Id. at 986-87 (citing 1 The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 53 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
After a month of debate on a wide range of issues, the delegates of the Convention
appointed a committee “for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably to the
Proceedings aforesaid” so that, going forward, the delegates would have one tangible document
on which to debate. Id. at 982 (citing 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 85
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). This Committee of Detail5 began its work with a broad,
general sketch of the legislative branch provided to it by the Convention:

5

The Committee of Detail was comprised of five delegates: Nathaniel Gorham, Massachusetts;
Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut; Edmund Randolph, Virginia; John Rutledge, South Carolina; and
James Wilson, Pennsylvania. Ewald, supra, at 982 (citing 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 87).

7
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Resolved[.] That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the
legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.
Id. at 986 (citing 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 53).
After nearly two weeks of work, the Committee of Detail presented its final document to
the Convention as a whole. Id. at 993. The document that emerged introduced 18 specifically
enumerated powers for the national legislature, rather than a general grant of legislative powers.
Id. at 986–93. Ultimately, most of the proposed enumerated powers were accepted and some
were rejected. Id. Importantly, though, none of the delegates questioned the principle that the
national government should be limited and comprised solely of defined, enumerated powers. Id.
at 994.
2.

The text of the Constitution explicitly creates a federal
government of enumerated powers.

This principle of a limited federal government comprised of defined, enumerated powers
was written expressly into the text of the Constitution. Unlike Article II of the Constitution,
which begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America,” and unlike Article III of the Constitution, which begins, “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . ,” Article I of the Constitution begins,
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.” U.S. Const. art. I–III
(emphasis added). In so doing, the Founders expressly limited Congress’s power to only those
powers enumerated “herein” the Constitution. See U.S. v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“The Constitution creates a federal government of limited and enumerated powers, and in
particular a Congress of limited and enumerated powers. The Article I Vesting Clause confirms
this proposition, vesting in Congress “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.” (Internal citations
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omitted)); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995) (explaining
that the Founders of the Constitution were keenly aware of the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (i.e., the enumeration of some excludes all others)).
3.

The doctrine of enumerated powers was embraced during
discussion and ratification of the proposed Constitution.

In the weeks and months following the Constitutional Convention, federalists promoting
the ratification of the Constitution extolled the principle of enumerated powers to such an extent
that the Constitution may not have been ratified had such a principle not been explicitly included.
As one Massachusetts newspaper explained, “‘The constitution defines the powers of Congress;
& every power, not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several state legislatures.’”
Lash, supra, at 1595 n.90 (quoting Editorial, Federal Constitution, Mass. Mercury (Salem),
Jan. 15, 1788, at 1). Similarly, a Virginia newspaper supporting ratification declared that
“‘should Congress attempt to exercise any powers which are not expressly delegated to them,
their acts would be considered as void, and disregarded.’” Id. at 1595 (quoting Alexander White,
To the Citizens of Virginia, Winchester Va. Gazette, Feb. 29, 1788).
At the Connecticut Convention, Oliver Ellsworth explained that, “If the United States go
beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and
the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made
independent, will declare it to be void.” Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), reprinted in Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates In The Several State
Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution 196 (Ayer Co. 1987) (1859).
Likewise, in the North Carolina Convention, Archibald Maclain explained that “‘[t]he powers of
Congress are limited and enumerated . . . . It is as plain a thing as possibly can be, that Congress
can have no power but what we expressly give them.’” Lash, supra, at 1596 (quoting Archibald

9

Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH Document 137

Filed 10/05/10 Page 18 of 30

Maclain, Remarks Before the Convention of the State of North Carolina (July 28, 1788)). James
Wilson succinctly expressed the principle of enumerated powers when he explained, at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, that “the supreme power . . . resides in the PEOPLE, as the
fountain of government . . . . They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such
terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.” James Wilson, Speech of Dec. 4, 1787,
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s14.html.
Perhaps the most famous series of newspaper articles supporting ratification of the
Constitution, The Federalist Papers, expressed similar perspectives. Alexander Hamilton
explained that “the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had, and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to the United States.” The
Federalist No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961), available at
http://www.constitution.org/fed/ federa32.htm. James Madison likewise provided that “the
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects.” The Federalist No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961),
available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa39.htm; see also The Federalist No. 45, at 328
(James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa45.htm
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
Indeed, Madison, colloquially known as the “father of the Constitution,” West Lynne
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994), repeatedly explained the constitutional
principle of enumerated powers even after ratification. In 1791, Madison clarified that “‘[n]o
power . . . not enumerated could be inferred from the general nature of Government. Had the
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power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been,
the defect could only have been lamented or supplied by an amendment to the Constitution.’”
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const.
L. 183, 192–93 (2003) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 1950 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791)). As Madison
said in 1792, during the Second Congress, “I, sir, have always conceived—I believe those who
proposed the Constitution conceived—it is still more fully known, and more material to observe,
that those who ratified the Constitution conceived—that this is not an indefinite government,
deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers—but a limited
government, tied down to the specified powers, which explain and define the general terms.”
On the Cod Fisheries Bill, granting Bounties (1792), available at http://www.constitution.org/
je/je4_cong_deb_12.htm. And, in 1794, Madison wrote that, “‘[w]hen the people have formed a
Constitution, they retain those rights which they have not expressly delegated.’” Lash, supra, at
1597 (quoting 4 Annals of Cong. 934 (1794)).
4.

The Bill of Rights demonstrates the scope and depth of the
doctrine of enumerated powers.

So widely accepted was the principle of enumerated powers amongst the Founders that
the idea of a Bill of Rights had “never struck the mind of any member of the late convention till
. . . within three days of the dissolution of that body, and even then, of so little account was the
idea, that it passed off in a short conversation, without introducing a formal debate, or assuming
the shape of a motion.” James Wilson and John Smilie, James Wilson and John Smilie Debate
the Need for a Bill of Rights (Nov. 28, 1787). Importantly, the initial rejection of a Bill of Rights
was not a repudiation of individual rights in favor of a federal government of plenary powers.
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Instead, the Bill of Rights was opposed by many delegates because of its implication on the
enumerated powers doctrine.6
As James Wilson, one of the five members of the Committee of Detail at the
Constitutional Convention, expounded at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly
enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated
is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration
would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of
the people would be rendered incomplete.
James Wilson, Remarks on the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), available at
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=978.
Likewise, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, who would later
become one of the original justices on the Supreme Court, proclaimed:
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the
strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired
by the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate
every one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases,
I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.

6

This was distinctly different from what existed in England.
Bills of rights had possessed a relevance in England where there is a king and a
House of Lords, quite distinct with respect to power and interest from the rest of
the people. Since the English kings had claimed all power and jurisdiction, bills
of rights like the Magna Carta had been considered by them as grants to the
people. A bill of rights was used in England to limit the king’s prerogative; he
could trample on the liberties of the people in every case which was not within
the restraint of the bill of rights.

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 539 (University of North
Carolina Press 1969) (internal quotations omitted).
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Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 49,
86 (1992) (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 97 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (July 29, 1788)).
Even the anti-federalist Federal Farmer, who was skeptical of a consolidation of power in
a federal government, acknowledged in 1788 that one of the proposed Constitution’s virtues was
its lack of a Bill of Rights, because the federal government would possess only specific,
enumerated powers. As he explained:
Many needless observations, and idle distinctions, in my opinion, have been made
respecting a bill of rights. On the one hand, it seems to be considered as a
necessary distinct limb of the constitution, and as containing a certain number of
very valuable articles, which are applicable to all societies: and, on the other, as
useless, especially in a federal government, possessing only enumerated power—
nay, dangerous, as individual rights are numerous, and not easy to be enumerated
in a bill or rights, and from articles, or stipulations, securing some of them, it may
be inferred, that others not mentioned are surrendered . . . . The supreme power is
undoubtedly in the people, and it is a principle well established in my mind, that
they reserve all powers not expressly delegated by them to those who govern; this
is as true in forming a state as in forming a federal government . . . . When we
particularly enumerate the powers given, we ought either carefully to enumerate
the rights reserved, or be totally silent about them; we must either particularly
enumerate both, or else suppose the particular enumeration of the powers given
adequately draws the line between them and the rights reserved, particularly to
enumerate the former and not the latter, I think most advisable: however, as men
appear generally to have their doubts about these silent reservations, we might
advantageously enumerate the powers given, and then in general words, according
to the mode adopted in the 2d art. of the confederation, declare all powers, rights
and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly given up.
Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788) available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s32.html.
Years later, Justice Arthur Goldberg, explained:
Alexander Hamilton was opposed to a bill of rights on the ground that it was
unnecessary because the Federal Government was a government of delegated
powers and it was not granted the power to intrude upon fundamental personal
rights. The Federalist, No. 84 (Cooke ed., 1961), at 578-579. He also argued,
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but
13
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would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers
which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext
to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would
confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. Id., at 579.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489 n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The Ninth Amendment, which provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” and the Tenth
Amendment, which provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people,” were included in the Bill of Rights specifically to preserve, unequivocally, the doctrine
of enumerated powers. Id. at 488-92 (Goldberg, J. concurring). Indeed, as Justice Goldberg
wrote:
The [Ninth] Amendment is almost entirely the work of James Madison. It was
introduced in Congress by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no
debate and virtually no change in language. It was proffered to quiet expressed
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to
cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be
interpreted as a denial that others were protected.
In presenting the proposed Amendment, Madison said:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were
not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against
the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive,
that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution (the
Ninth Amendment).
I Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834).
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring). It is, therefore, clear that the debate
over the inclusion of a bill of rights, and the inclusion therein of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, demonstrate the scope and depth of the doctrine of enumerated powers.
5.

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the
federal government possesses only limited, enumerated powers.

A long line of cases has established conclusively that the Constitution creates a federal
government of limited, enumerated powers. First, in the 1803 seminal case of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall explained: “The powers of
the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written.” Later, in 1819, the Supreme Court again proclaimed that “[t]his
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.” M’Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). Five years later, the Supreme Court again explained that the
Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their
government.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824). Indeed, “the constant
declaration of this court from the beginning is that this government is one of enumerated
powers.” Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 (1907).
More recent decisions reach the same conclusion. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 516 (1997), the Supreme Court proclaimed, “Under our Constitution, the Federal
Government is one of enumerated powers.” Likewise, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
552 (1995), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that:
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote: “The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). This
constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the Framers to
ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Just as the separation and
15
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independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid.
Id. Again, in 2000, the Supreme Court explained that, “With its careful enumeration of federal
powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are
reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government
an unlimited license to regulate.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000).
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one
or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
Ultimately, the principle that the federal government is one of limited, enumerated
powers is so well documented in the history of the Colonies, so thoroughly and painstakingly set
forth in documents that led up to the Constitution, as well as in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights themselves, and so thoughtfully protected in the Supreme Court cases that interpreted the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, that it cannot seriously be argued that it is not a bedrock
principle—perhaps the single most important principle—enshrined in the Constitution.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; OTHERWISE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WOULD CEASE TO BE A GOVERNMENT OF ENUMERATED
POWERS.
Should this Court uphold the Individual Mandate, the federal government would no

longer be limited to its enumerated powers. The centuries-old doctrine upon which the federal
government is based would be eviscerated.
The Commerce Clause provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes[.]”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The plain language of the Clause, even with help from the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which provides that Congress has the power to “make all Laws which shall be
16
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necessary and proper” to execute the other enumerated powers, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18,
does not empower Congress to regulate any and all forms of human activity or inactivity.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-08 (“[E]ven [our] modern-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer
limits.”).
Yet by enacting the Individual Mandate, that is precisely what Congress has purported to
do. Indeed, by enacting the Individual Mandate, Congress is, for the first time in the history of
the United States, requiring individuals to purchase a product against their will. In effect,
Congress has asserted the power to regulate economic inactivity—the decision to refrain from
engaging in interstate commerce—through the Commerce Clause.7 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli,
702 F.Supp.2d at 612 (“Never before has the Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and
Proper Clause been extended this far.”). Such an interpretation has two significant ramifications
on the enumerated powers doctrine.
A.

If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The Commerce
Power, The Commerce Clause Will Swallow Up The Other
Enumerated Powers.

Should a court uphold such a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the
Commerce Clause will swallow up all the other enumerated powers in the Constitution and
become the lone omnipotent enumerated power. Indeed, if the Commerce Clause empowers
Congress to regulate economic inactivity, “many of Congress’ other enumerated powers under
Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J. concurring). If
Congress has the power, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate an individual’s inactivity,
as well as interstate commerce, then:
7

This Court characterized Plaintiff’s position thusly: “[A] decision not to purchase a product,
such as health insurance, is not an economic activity. It is a virtual state of repose—or
idleness—the converse of activity.” Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F.Supp.2d at 610.
17
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[T]here is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact
bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and
measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6.
Likewise, Congress would not need the separate authority to establish post offices
and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to “punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” cl. 10. It might not even need
the power to raise and support an Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer
people would engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a foreign power
could expropriate their property with ease. . . . An interpretation of cl. 3 that
makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct.
Id. at 588-89 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 520 n.6
(2008) (discussing the often-cited canon of construction providing that text should be interpreted
such that no provision is rendered superfluous).8
B.

If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The Commerce
Power, The Principle Of A Limited Federal Government With
Enumerated Powers Will Be Eviscerated.

Neither the Commerce Clause standing alone, nor in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, can be interpreted broadly and still remain
consistent with the doctrine of enumerated powers. As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story
remarked:
What, then, is the true constitutional sense of the words “necessary and proper”
in this clause? It has been insisted by the advocates of a rigid interpretation,
that the word “necessary” is here used in its close and most intense meaning; so
that it is equivalent to absolutely and indispensably necessary. It has been said,
8

An earlier Supreme Court case further discusses this canon of construction:
In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its
due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument,
that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many
discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution,
have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the
caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word
appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and
effect to have been fully understood. No word in the instrument, therefore, can
be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning[.]

Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 571 (1840).
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that the constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those,
which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a
latitude of construction be given to this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated
power, it will go far to give every one; for there is no one, which ingenuity
might not torture into a convenience in some way or other to some one of so
long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers,
and reduce the whole to one phrase. Therefore it is, that the constitution has
restrained them to the necessary means; that is to say, to those means, without
which the grant of the power would be nugatory. A little difference in the
degree of convenience cannot constitute the necessity, which the constitution
refers to.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3, § 1239 (1833) available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_18s21.html.
Should the Individual Mandate be upheld as a lawful exercise of the Commerce Clause
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, the limited federal government of enumerated powers
would be transformed into an omnipotent government of plenary powers. Indeed, if Congress is
empowered to regulate all spheres of activity—or inactivity—in an individual’s life, except those
explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights, the doctrine of enumerated powers, upon which the
United States was founded, would cease to exist as to the federal government. Under such a
scheme, unalienable rights would be derived not from individuals, as the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution provide, but, instead, would exist solely as a permissive
license by the federal government. To be sure, “[i]f the Court always defers to Congress . . . ,
little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 47 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). No court that takes its duty to interpret and uphold the Constitution
seriously may authorize such a radical metamorphosis of a centuries old doctrine at the very
foundation of the Nation.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, this Court should grant the Commonwealth of Virginia’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and deny the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
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